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ABSTRACT 
In his recent book, Zero Tolerance: Hot Button Politics in Canada s 
Universities (1996), Richard Emberley attacks the government, business 
community, university administrators, magazine publishers and acade-
mics for their complicity in pushing Canadian universities to the point of 
ruin. His accusation is that academe is pressed to achieve so many social, 
political and economic objectives that it risks not being successful in any 
of them. He provides a number of recommendations for restructuring 
higher education and these are presented in the context of a very rich con-
ception of what a university should be. This paper examines Emberley's 
account of universities and the "scholarly culture" which has developed 
since the 13th century. It is argued that Emberley has an overly narrow 
view of the role of a university and one that is based on certain mistaken 
presumptions about what constitutes value in education. 
RÉSUMÉ 
Dans son nouveau livre, Zero Tolerance: Hot Button Politics in 
Canada's Universities (1996), Richard Emberley attaque le gouvernement, 
la communauté des affaires, les administrateurs des universités, les éditeurs 
de magazines, et les professeurs pour leur complicité dans l'effondrement 
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des universités canadiennes. Le monde académique serait chargé de tant 
d'objectifs sociaux, politiques, et économiques qu'il risque de n'atteindre 
aucun d'entre eux. L'auteur recommande plusieurs réformes du système 
universitaire, au vu du riche contexte que devrait être une université. La 
présent article examine l'histoire des universités et la culture académique 
depuis son début au 13e siècle à partir des travaux d'Emberley. La 
perspective d'Emberley vis-à-vis du rôle des universités s'avère trop étroite 
et de plus, fondée sur des préjugés quant à ce qui devrait constituer la 
contribution de l'éducation au bien publique. 
CANADIAN UNIVERSITIES IN CRISIS 
For decades academics have been predicting the demise of the uni-
versity. One recent disaster forecast is Peter Emberley's (1996) Zero 
Tolerance: Hot Button Politics in Canada's Universities. Emberley's 
starting point is with the arresting claim that Canadian universities are 
"under siege"(p. 1). He invites us to recall, for instance, the Fabrikant 
murders at Concordia, the shooting of women students at the École 
Polytechnique, allegations of systemic racism and sexism at UBC, strike 
votes and expressions of non-confidence in the president at Mount 
Allison, government funding cut-backs, high profile cases of scholars 
falsifying research data and much more. He laments that universities are 
in a state of crisis, caught between two extreme forces: the "corporate 
right" and the "cultural left". Each pushes the "hot buttons" of fabricated 
issues, and then offers "quick fix" solutions. These bandage-style reme-
dies cannot work because they run counter to the traditions of academe 
and the "scholarly culture" which have developed since the Middle 
Ages. In consequence, "cracks are appearing all over the academic land-
scape" (p. 9), "testy relations have formed between universities and 
provincial governments"(p. 9), [PJarents are confused and angry" (p. 9), 
"professors are burning out"(p. 9), "support staff are stretched to the 
limit"(p. 9), "students are beside themselves"(p. 9), and the "general 
mood is discouraging" (p. 9). The university is itself "on the verge of 
financial, spiritual and political collapse" (p. 1). Indeed, Emberley asks, 
"can we today doubt, in light of the tumult in Canada's universities, that 
we are in the midst of anything less than a revolution — one that will 
forever change these institutions?" (p. 11). More, he says, "we are 
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witnessing in this country overall a colossal breakdown of moral order in 
civil society. The university, with its openness to unconventionalism, is 
the primary site for this breakdown" (p. 237). 
Emberley identifies a wide range of crimes against the university 
and berates virtually every educational constituency for complicity. But 
Professor Emberley has a solution and many recommendations which, if 
implemented, would constitute a major policy shift in Canadian higher 
education. Fundamental to his approach is detaching the university from 
the social and economic mandates which are being imposed upon it and 
returning to the historic ideals of scholarly contemplation and dialogue. 
Emberley is not alone in his frustrations. Throughout the 1990s the 
already extensive literature on the challenges facing academe has grown 
further. For instance, D. D'Souza (1992) in Illiberal Education: The 
Politics of Race and Sex on Campus provided a compelling account of 
how race and gender policies at universities such as Berkeley, Stanford, 
Duke, Howard, Michigan and Harvard actually harmed those whom they 
were intended to help, and made liberal education a casualty in the 
process. These themes were picked up in edited collections such as The 
Imperiled Academy by Howard Dickman (1993) and in J. Arthur and A. 
Shapiro (1995) Campus Wars: Multiculturalism and the Politics of 
Difference. Similar matters were discussed in relation to academic free-
dom in L. Menand (Ed.) (1996), The Future of Academic Freedom. A 
lively and provocative Canadian account was provided by D. Bercuson, 
R. Bothwell and J. Granatstein (1997), Petrified Campus: The Crisis in 
Canada s Universities. As does Emberley, the latter also addressed issues 
such as university financing, tenure and the rising prominence of admin-
istrative functions such as strategic planning. J. Pelikan (1992) The Idea 
of the University: A Reexamination explored Cardinal Newman's concep-
tion of a university and the inherent value of what it teaches, something 
which forms the backdrop to Zero Tolerance. In B. Readings (1996) The 
University in Ruins, there was agreement with Emberley's view that the 
university has broken loose from its historical moorings. Readings (now 
deceased) believed that the university once existed to promote and protect 
national culture. However, the university now resembles a transnational 
corporation — focussed on operational goals which can be expressed in 
degrees of excellence and governance as a techno-bureaucracy with 
administration as the priority. On this point Readings was of a similar 
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mind to Bercuson et al. But, unlike Emberley, Readings did not believe it 
would ever be possible to return to the historic mission of the university, 
principally because national cultures have withered away. 
Reading's worry about the rising prominence of governance and 
administrat ion has support. C. Hardy (1996) in The Politics of 
Collegiality has shown, by way of case studies of McGill, University of 
Montreal, University of British Columbia, Simon Fraser, University of 
Toronto and Carleton, the considerable extent to which universities have 
had to develop strategies and managerial techniques (read, a dramati-
cally increasing administrative focus) to deal with financial retrench-
ment, shrinking enrolments and public demands for accountability. More 
horrifying still, for Emberley and the like-minded, S. Slaughter and 
L. Leslie (1997) in Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the 
Entrepreneurial University explained how governments in Canada, 
USA, UK and Australia view universities as vehicles to pursue national 
economic competitiveness. In compliance, universities are increasingly 
developing entrepreneurial skills and linking with business and govern-
ment in the development of new academic programming and research. 
This is the very antithesis of Emberley's conception of a university. 
Despite the many books in this decade lamenting the sorry state of 
higher education, I think Emberley's central thesis deserves a detailed 
examination. One reason is that his notion of the proper role of a univer-
sity is likely to be very controversial. It will no doubt find support with 
many members of the professoriate, especially in the humanities and 
social sciences. However, for policy makers in provincial ministries of 
education, NSERC and SSHRC (who are promoting business/govern-
ment/education partnerships in many of their grants), professional edu-
cators (e.g., law, business, social work, medicine, education and 
engineering), or professors who see themselves as being obligated to 
ready students for life in the new economy, Emberley's program will not 
be welcome news. In many respects, Professor Emberley stands against 
most of the current trends in higher education reform. I believe that his 
stylized picture of the university is flawed. It is very narrow, based on an 
impressionistic rendering of history and too reliant on history to justify 
the present. And, if policy decisions were to be driven by Emberley's 
vision, our troubled but basically sound universities would be signifi-
cantly weakened. 
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A second reason for wanting to focus on Zero Tolerance is that it 
provides a more comprehensive analysis than do most other works. 
Emberley sketches a rich conception of what a university should be and 
the type of the education that should take place within it. He considers 
the nature of the educational process, what knowledge should be taught 
and the central methods of teaching. His treatment of contemporary 
problems such as the politics of race and gender, and his various policy 
recommendations, flow from, and are justified by, his concept of a uni-
versity education. Others, such as Pelikan (1992) and Readings (1996), 
dealt with the concept of a university but had less to offer on policy mat-
ters. D'Souza, Bercuson et al, Hardy and others addressed policy and 
administrative problems from the perspective of liberal education, but 
not based upon a full-fledged conceptual analysis of a university educa-
tion. So, by providing a commentary on Emberley's position, the issues 
raised by others will be aired as well. 
In what follows, I intend to set out and critique Professor Emberley's 
view of the university and its scholarly culture. I also want to consider his 
characterization of the two major agents of extremist reform — the corpo-
rate right and cultural left — since understanding their impact is important 
to appreciating his overall concept of education. Space limitations will 
restrict me to commenting on only one of his policy recommendations, 
namely his claim that universities should be detached from concerns about 
society and the economy and that applied and practical aspects of univer-
sity programs should be separated into different institutions. It is essential 
to deal with this point because it is, likewise, central to his notion of a uni-
versity. Emberley's views on tenure, tuition, distance learning technology 
and so on will need to wait for an evaluation by others. 
THE UNIVERSITY AND ITS SCHOLARLY CULTURE 
What is the function of a university? In answering this, Emberley fol-
lows very closely the work of the British idealist political philosopher 
Michael Oakeshott (1962a, 1962b, 1962c, 1967, 1972). To Emberley (and 
Oakeshott), the university cannot be understood properly outside of its 
historical context. So, Emberley begins his account with the founding of 
universities in the 13th century (pp. 26-29) and two counter-balancing 
conceptions of academe. The first is Universitas. This is an association 
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bound together in common undertakings and by shared purposes. Its 
principle commitment is to the pursuit of knowledge and objective truth. 
He maintains that the roots of academe are evident in the ancient 
Socratic conception of developing political order and civil society 
through knowledge and the capacity for rational thought. With this is the 
desire to know morally right conduct as was exemplified by the life and 
teaching of Christ (pp. 30-33). The second conception of a university is 
civitas. An institution conceived of in this mode is not to be understood 
so much in terms of purposes, but of customs and the norms governing 
civil behavior. Essential is an atmosphere of civility which is conducive 
to conversation, discussion and debate. It requires a respect for the opin-
ions of others and a willingness to probe, explore and understand them. 
Emberley then blends universitas/civitas to give a characterization 
of the university in which the pursuit of knowledge and truth is engaged 
in by its members in an atmosphere of civilized intellectual exploration. 
This is the "scholarly culture" — a unique way of life that binds together 
professors and their students. A university education is, in effect, an 
initiation into this scholarly culture: it is a process of welcoming the 
younger generation into the genteel pursuits of academe. 
An important feature of Emberley's account, following Oakeshott, is 
that education so construed does not have ends or objectives. It is a 
process. Emberley quotes Oakeshott, saying, "University education is 
not a beginning and not an end, but a middle . . . a mysterious interaction 
of the needs of students and the scholarly culture"(pp. xii-xiii) . 
Moreover, student needs are pitched in terms of intellectual, spiritual and 
emotional yearnings rather than, say, vocational skills or understandings. 
Emberley and Oakeshott are very much opposed to the idea that a uni-
versity should be involved in professional education (e.g., business, law, 
engineering, medicine, etc.), or indeed, any specific preparation of stu-
dents for the working world. 
What are these processes of interaction? The answer is reading 
(pp. 39-48) and conversation (pp. 48-52). Books serve as the main way 
of awakening, cultivating and maturing students. They are an important 
vehicle for self- interpretat ion and the exploration of meaning. 
Conversation is a collaborative exchange: the creative interplay of 
judgements which involves qualifications, corrections, shifts in position, 
additions and refinements to points of view. As Emberley sums it up, 
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"the forms of understanding and friendship that comprise the univer-
sity's highest accomplishment emerge in the leisurely dialogues and 
meditative withdrawal that the university affords its members" (p. 257). 
Emberley's exposition is wide ranging and its various pieces, elabo-
rations and re-descriptions are peppered throughout the book. This 
makes it difficult to be sure that one has the complete picture, but the 
following seem to be the main points. His university is (1) a place where 
students are initiated into their cultural heritage. Education (2) is a 
process, not a means to further ends. (3) Reading and conversation are 
the main components of the process. (4) The role of a university is to 
deal with knowledge and moral understanding because they have inher-
ent value, not social or economic utility. The university (5) should be 
substantially detached in its teaching and research from the direct day to 
day concerns of society. Students ought not to be specifically prepared 
for employment, nor should the university be a vehicle for economic or 
social development. (6) Certain commitments are essential to scholar-
ship such as to the objectivity of knowledge and the pursuit of truth. 
(7) Civility knits the academic community together. 
To appreciate the importance of these characteristics, and their place 
in the current public policy debates, it is very helpful to consider the two 
principal forces which Emberley thinks are driving the university away 
from its historic mission. 
THE CORPORATE RIGHT 
The corporate right, and its reformist agenda, is a "family-resem-
blance point of view that coalesces out of the opinions of rotarians and 
chambers of commerce, professional business organizations, recent gov-
ernments on both left and right, the media, policy wonks at the Fraser 
Institute and the C.D. Howe Institute and many university managers" 
(pp. 153-154). Typical of this camp is a bottom-line orientation: it treats 
universities as the engines of economic growth, establishes performance 
measures based on economic efficiency and sees the university as an 
expense rather than an investment. The corporate right understands and 
addresses educational issues in the language of consumers and cus-
tomers, marketing, privatization, re-engineering and rationalization. And 
among its hot buttons are greater representation of industry on university 
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boards of governors, business/government/university partnerships and 
various user-pay approaches to financial issues such as vouchers and 
income contingent loan programs. Especially prominent on the corporate 
right's agenda is the demand for accountability, principally in the form 
of performance measures such as those provided by the Maclean's rank-
ings (pp. 115-125). 
Consider this in light of the first five characteristics identified a 
moment ago: (1) initiation, (2) process, (3) reading/conversation, 
(4) pursuit of what has inherent value, i.e., truth and goodness, and (5) 
detachment from economic and societal concerns. None of these items 
fits well with the corporate right's way of thinking. An initiation into cul-
ture is fine, to a point. But the business community wants graduates who 
can understand the world as it is, solve problems and employ fundamen-
tal business skills in dealing with day to day issues. Next, there may be 
many different processes undertaken to transmit knowledge and skill, but 
there must ultimately be a measurable result. The corporate right would 
never agree that education is solely a process. Further, reading and con-
versation are central to education. No one on the corporate right would 
likely deny this. But reading and conversation are not just educational 
processes, they are ends. Communication skills are essential to being 
effective in business. And, the corporate right would not be satisfied with 
a university education that dealt only with reading and conversation. It 
wants more by way of understanding and competency, namely, the kind 
of outcomes which other processes would lead to: internships in industry 
to develop competence in the business environment, technical skill devel-
opment in computing and accounting, and so on. Concerning the pursuit 
of truth and goodness, the corporate right would not oppose this. But 
much more is demanded. There may be inherent value in the study of 
music and philosophy, but understanding the way the economy works has 
value too — practical, or instrumental, value. Finally, detachment would 
not be acceptable to business, government, research granting agencies 
and the general public. After all, they are calling for closer, not more dis-
tant, connections between academic institutions and the economy. 
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THE CULTURAL LEFT 
The opposing faction, the cultural left, is likewise committed to 
reforming universities. But, economic development and accountability 
are not the issues. The cultural left wants extensive social transformation. 
The university should be a change agent to bring about social equality in 
gender, race and ethnicity. Emberley's problem is that this goes well 
beyond social critique which is a commonly accepted function of univer-
sities. The cultural left has hijacked the mission of the university. Rather 
than teaching and learning as an exploration of the human experience 
through the arts, sciences and humanities, the cultural left has made the 
university and its educational activities into a social renovation project. 
Worse, its hostility is destroying the scholarly culture. Academe's charac-
teristically civilized debate has yielded to the pressing of hot buttons 
related to gender and culture in a way that generates rage, abusive behav-
ior and a climate of suspicion, animosity and litigiousness. The cultural 
left relies on vitriol, vindictiveness, sloganeering, hyperbole, obscuran-
tism, humourlessness, vulgarity, taunts, abusiveness, cruel indecencies, 
belittlement and insensibility. He comments that the "cultural left's major 
contribution to the demise of Canada's universities is the pathologization 
of faculty and student behaviour, because in the empire of social work 
that the cultural left has built up at the university to 'cure' students and 
faculty, the first thing dispensed with was the natural trust inherent in the 
scholarly culture" (p. 202). 
Whereas the corporate right violates the first five of the characteris-
tics of Emberley's model university, the cultural left offends the remain-
ing two. The university, qua universitas, requires an allegiance to 
(6) objectivity and truth. As civitas, its commitment is to (7), respectful 
conversation, openness and collegiality. But neither is possible with the 
cultural left which interprets all human interaction, thought and language 
as inherently political. So the ideals of objectivity and universal truth are 
rejected. Political action replaces argument, and its methods are not gov-
erned by the rules of civilized discourse. In consequence, Emberley 
maintains, "the cultural left's rhetoric and its eye to political gains have 
presented these changes in such a way as to produce paralysis and intol-
erance on Canada's campuses" (p. 212). 
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DETACHMENT AS A SOLUTION 
The university, as Emberley sees it, is pulled and pushed by the cor-
porate right and cultural left in so many directions that it is unable to be 
effective in any of them. He says "the university cannot simultaneously 
be an engine of economic growth, a social welfare agency, a laboratory 
for new consciousness, a training center and a home for the scholarly cul-
ture. Something has to give" (p. 258). What he therefore proposes is the 
development of a system of higher education which would separate insti-
tutions whose grounding is in "theoretical" knowledge from those which 
deal with predominately "applied" knowledge. The former would be 
called universit ies and the latter, polytechnics. Emberley explains: 
"Universities would remain places where the culture of scholarship could 
proceed undisturbed and where the primary attention would be paid to 
frontier research, to cultivating critical reason and imagination and to fos-
tering political citizenship and public service" (p. 262).1 By contrast, he 
says that the "polytechnics would house the research facilities associated 
with our 'engines of economic growth' and 'engines of social change' 
and with research in the fields of the applied sciences, thus serving the 
primary task of preparing students for vocations and fostering the prag-
matic aspects of social reform" (p. 262). 
This is a rather neat solution but is it a good one? I do not think it is. 
To show this we will consider, first, the strategy Emberley uses to make 
his case. Second, a closer look will be taken at the characteristics he 
thinks universities should have. 
IS EMBERLEY RIGHT ABOUT UNIVERSITIES? 
Many academics would agree that Emberley's university has a lot 
going for it. But to say that it has value is not to say that it is the only 
model which does. Some would prefer different approaches, even 
though they might admire the fine qualities of Emberley's. They might, 
for instance, believe that a two-tiered university system which differenti-
ates research-based from teaching-based universities would more effec-
tively achieve the objectives of both functions. Or, they might opt for a 
closer connection among universities, business and government as a bet-
ter way of achieving broader societal objectives. But Emberley is not 
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saying that his view is just one among several which are viable. He is 
convinced that his concept is the legitimate one. Others which are not 
compatible with his should be rejected. 
Professor Emberley writes with intensity and passion. For the con-
verted, there is much stirring encouragement. But anyone who has misgiv-
ings would find very little actual argument on the basis of which to come 
around the Emberley's way of thinking. Apart from his appeal to the reader 
to consider the needs of students and to see how his view accommodates 
this, he has a very limited range of persuasive strategies. There are, though, 
some arguments implicit in his program which we will explore. 
Oakeshott's Traditionalist Argument 
Emberley's description of the historical evolution of universities has 
a normative element. His presumption is that, except for the recent inter-
ruptions by the corporate right and cultural left, what has emerged from 
the historical process is what we should approve of today. Emberley 
does not use an independent set of educational criteria to evaluate the 
historical model. Instead, he uses the historically generated account as a 
criterion for analyzing contemporary situations and to project into the 
future what we ought to do. Granted, he does justify the specific content 
of his model by pointing to the inherent value of the knowledge with 
which the university should be concerned; and he shows how his 
approach addresses the ontological needs and yearnings of students. But 
he does not demonstrate why those educational aims and not others (i.e., 
preparing students for careers or developing research to help the econ-
omy) are preferable. He simply presumes an evolutionary result is suffi-
cient accreditation for the present. 
Emberley is vulnerable to the charge that no matter how appropriate 
his model might have been in the past, it is not what we need in our con-
temporary society. So, he requires an argument to legitimize his model. 
One possibility is to consider Michael Oakeshott's (1962a) treatment of 
this problem. While I do not want to impute to Emberley a view that he 
does not hold, this might be a way of grounding the historical rendering 
in a supportive theory. Since he does adopt both Oakeshott's concept of 
education and methodology of historical exegesis, the argument would 
be compatible with Professor Emberley's overall position. 
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Like other idealist philosophers, such as Burke, Hegel and Bradley, 
Michael Oakeshott believed that social institutions cannot be understood 
independently from their intellectual and institutional traditions. We are 
conceptually locked into our past. It is our traditions which enable us to 
generate new ideas about what we can do with our political and social 
institutions in the future. We build upon what we know. Our future con-
cepts are only extensions of what we already have. Based on our direct 
and indirect experiences of the past and our understanding of our cul-
tural traditions, we are able to advance in the future by making adjust-
ments to our existing institutions. Oakeshott referred to this as the 
"pursuit of intimations" (1962a, p. 133). In deciding what to do, we 
should use our judgement about what will enhance the very best aspects 
of our traditions. Implicitly, we evolve our institutions for the better. So, 
in Oakeshott's view, the normative elements of change are embedded in 
the historical development (Benn & Peters, 1959). Universities today, 
therefore, can only be extensions of their historical development and this 
evolutionary form is superior to all others. 
Let us assume that Oakeshott's "traditionalist theory" is correct. In 
order for it to support Emberley's model, the model itself needs to be an 
accurate reflection of the historical evolution. I am not sure that it passes 
this test. For instance, Emberley portrays the university of the past as 
being devoted to theory and truth. But, many Canadian and American 
universities were founded in the 19th century more to serve religious 
interests than scholarship and independent thought (Careless, 1953/1991, 
p. 162; Ladd & Lipsett, 1975, p. 11; Lipsett, 1993). Ladd Jr. and Lipset 
(1975) maintained about American colleges that "faculty did not stray 
far from traditional revealed truth. Professors sought to socialize new 
generations in the accepted system of values. Colleges were largely cen-
ters of conventional thought"(p. 11). And as for the supposition that uni-
versities have, historically, been detached from concerns about society, 
the economy and careers, this is not really accurate either. As Whitehead 
(1929, 1967) observed 70 years ago, 
At no time have universities been restricted to pure abstract 
learning. The University of Salerno in Italy, the earliest of 
European universities, was devoted to medicine. In England, 
at Cambridge, in the year 1316, a college was founded for the 
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special purpose of providing 'clerks for the King's service.' 
Universities have trained clergy, medical men, lawyers, engi-
neers. Business is now a highly intellectualized vocation, so 
it fits well into the series, (p. 92) 
In the past century, universities have been used to prepare young 
people for the needs of the economy. Niblett (1974) observed, "the pres-
sure grows on higher education in almost every country to produce grad-
uates useful to a society eager for more and more technology and 
know-how. This pressuré can be seen to have been growing for at least a 
hundred years" (p. 2). y^nd, as Bliss (1987) noted about recent Canadian 
history, "In the late fifties, higher education of all kinds was sold to 
Canadians as the only way to develop the nation's 'human capital'" (p. 
500). He went on to point to the explosion of interest in business educa-
tion throughout the 1960's. In fact, according to the Canadian Federation 
of Business School Deans (1994), from 1970 to 1990, the number of 
Canadian university degrees in all disciplines doubled. During the same 
period, business education flourished and degrees increased by a factor 
of roughly 4.5 times. Moreover, concerning the US experience, Jencks 
and Reisman (1968) contended that, "purity of motive and single-mind-
edness of purpose have never been characteristic of American colleges . 
. . the question has always been how an institution mixed the academic 
with the vocational, not whether it did so" (p. 199). So, if Emberley is 
saying that the university of today should mirror the scholarly culture of 
the past, it seems reasonable to question how much of his account is rep-
resentative of historical realities and how much is idealized? Granted, 
Emberley may be correct and those cited above wrong. But, at very least 
we can say that Emberley's sketch of the past is controversial. 
To press the traditionalist strategy further, we could ask that if his-
tory does justify the future, could history legitimate a different future 
than Professor Emberley's? Suppose we looked back thirty years to a 
time in universities that predates the turmoil caused by the corporate 
right and cultural left. Would we encounter then, the kind of institution 
which Emberley recommends? I do not think that we would. 
For over a century, one prevalent university model in North America 
has been the "multiversity",3 namely a many-purposed institution which 
includes, graduate schools, research institutes, joint ventures with busi-
ness, professional education as well as the arts, humanities, social and 
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natural sciences. This model has been developing consistently since the 
turn of the century (Kerr, 1963; Rothman, 1993, p. 41). In the US, as the 
land grant institutions were founded during the 19th century, engineering, 
agriculture, home economics and business were brought into the univer-
sity. Even Harvard, Columbia, Chicago and many other private institu-
tions, grew well beyond the liberal arts. There was more of a liberal arts 
tradition in Canada until the end of World War II. But since that time the 
American model seems to characterize virtually all of the major provincial 
universities (e.g., UBC, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, etc.) as well as 
McMaster, Toronto, Queen's, McGill, Dalhousie and so on. So if the past 
gives justification for the present, as traditionalists maintain, does not the 
multiversity concept have as much of a claim to legitimate standing as the 
historical notion which Emberley has explicated?4 
Even if we allowed that Emberley's liberal arts conception is the 
correct historical product, it is very difficult to see why we should accept 
the normative position that it should be adopted today. Oakeshott is right 
to say that we cannot completely escape our intellectual past. We cannot 
stand apart from the conceptual structure embodied in our language — 
an historical product. But we can work within its framework to construct 
new realities for ourselves. Even if we inherit the image of a liberal arts 
college, we can amend it to focus, say, more on research than on student 
centered-teaching. Or we can alter a discipline-based curricula and the 
resulting "inert knowledge", as Whitehead (1929/1967) used to say, and 
c h a n g e to the p r o b l e m so lv ing o r i en t a t i on f a v o r e d by D e w e y 
(1938/1973). We do not need to wipe clean our conceptual make-up in 
order to envision something new and suitable to our needs. We can for-
mulate educational principles on the basis of which to make a normative 
assessment of the desirability of retaining unaltered the institutions 
which are the legacy of history. Oakeshott is right to say that we are 
influenced by the past. We are not imprisoned by it, though. 
The Essential Characteristics of Universities 
Let us try another approach to examining Emberley's model by de-
l inking it f rom his tory and focus ing on the condit ions he thinks 
describe a proper university. Start with those which the corporate right 
seems to offend: (1) initiation, (2) process, not ends, (3) reading/ 
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conversation, (4) truth and goodness as inherently valuable, (5) detach-
ment: education as non-vocational. 
When we say that education is an initiation into a cultural heritage, 
items (2), (3) and (4) explain what is entailed by that. Speaking of edu-
cation as a process is very important because it tells us that the enterprise 
is never complete. And this is germane to Emberley's view. If he is cor-
rect, the emphasis placed by the corporate right on accountability and 
performance measures is inappropriate because there should never be an 
end to evaluate. But, surely this cannot be correct. Even if we agree that 
a person's education is never finished because there is always more 
room for him or her to develop and to learn, it is still possible to refer to 
someone as being an "educated person". At some point we can claim 
that the university's institutional job is done. As Peters (1967) says, 
'"being educated' is the achievement relative to a family of tasks which 
we call processes of education" (p. 2). In universities, students pass 
courses and are granted degrees. Institutional processes come to an end. 
The corporate right's desire for performance targets and accountability 
relates to the achievement aspect of the concept of education. The real 
issue is not questioning whether universities should have ends, targets or 
goals, it is establishing those which are most appropriate. 
Much the same could be said about reading/conversation as educa-
tional processes. No one associated with universities would deny their 
worth. But other processes have value too. Experimentation in science, 
field trips in archeology, performance in music, internships in govern-
ment for political science students, co-op placements for engineers and 
business students, etc. are process examples that, while they are in no 
way incompatible with reading/conversation, are not extensions of them. 
Emberley is so focused on reading/conversation that his university 
appears to be dedicated mainly to the humanities. He certainly does not 
rule out the sciences, but it is hard to see how a student who concentrates 
on physics and math, where the central processes are experimentation, 
analysis, calculation, testing, evidence and proof, would fit into his 
notion of what a university should be doing. 
Where Emberley's program has some strong potential support is in 
characteristic (4): universities should be engaged in activities which 
have inherent value. As a justification for the detachment of universities 
from concerns of the economy, jobs and so forth ((5) above), this view is 
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similarly prominent in the writing of Matthew Arnold (1886/1932), 
Cardinal Newman, 1858/1925), Allan Bloom (1987) and certainly 
Oakeshott (1962a, 1962b). Because Emberley also takes the view that 
students should be educated for citizenship, his conception has similari-
ties to that of the ancient Greeks. While he may not subscribe to their 
metaphysical realism, namely that through knowledge the mind attains its 
own end i.e., knowing the essential nature of things and grasping what is 
ultimately real and immutable, he would share with Plato the commit-
ment to the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake — its inherent value. 
But, is this an adequate justification for moving the applied studies out of 
the university in a remodeling of the Canadian university sector? 
Grant that learning for its own sake is desirable. Does this mean, 
thereby, that other reasons for learning do not have value? Does the 
recognition that learning has inherent value exclude the legitimacy of 
learning something because it has instrumental value (Griffiths, 1965)? 
Why should instrumental justifications be rejected out of hand? To begin 
with, it is important to distinguish between two types of instrumental 
justification: those which are external to the activity in question and 
those which are internal (Peters, 1973,1977). First, suppose we said that 
the justification for studying biology is that it leads to happiness. ^Ve 
would be giving a reason for doing it that is not part of biology. 
Happiness per se is not dependent upon anything to do with biology. 
And taking courses in biology may not lead to happiness. Happiness and 
biology are not part of each other. Happiness is external to biology and 
may be used as an instrumental justification only if in fact it does result 
from studying biology. 
Now consider an instrumental justification which is internal to the 
subject of study. Having the ability to earn a living as a biologist or to 
gain entry to medical school requires the prior study of biology. In these 
cases biology is not being studied for its own sake, but as a means to a 
further end. But the ends in question are connected to biology; they are 
attained specifically by studying the discipline. The justification is 
instrumental, but internal to what is being studied. 
Instrumental justifications of the first kind, are not the real competi-
tion for Emberley because they may work in some circumstances and not 
others. They are only contingently related to the subject of study. The 
second type of instrumental justification cannot be so easily dismissed. 
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Suppose the argument is made that taking a BA in English literature 
prepares a student well for a career in the public or private sectors 
because of the qualities and capacities it develops: sensitivity to other 
people, communication skills, the capacity to comprehend difficult writ-
ten positions and the ability to see through complex arguments and pre-
pare reasoned responses. This internal instrumental justification is 
embedded in the study of literature. So, why is this not an acceptable 
reason for studying this discipline? Or, what if a student began taking a 
major in literature because of a love for the subject but later came to see 
its practical value and pursued it because the prospect of a job as a mag-
azine editor overtook inherent value as the main attraction? In this case 
the inherent value justification gave way to the instrumental value. 
Indeed, the reverse could be the case. If a student began an engineering 
program with a career in mind, then became fascinated by the subject 
matter and continued for that reason, the justification would have been 
instrumental first, then intrinsic. The reality for most students is that 
what piques their interest at one time, differs from that at another. 
Finally, some subjects such as business, medical or environmental ethics 
combine what has value in its own right with prescriptions for improving 
the way institutions in the public and private sectors behave which is 
valuable for their outcomes. Inherent and instrumental values are inter-
woven. In sum, I can see no reason why either justification, alone or in 
combination is not adequate. 
Professor Emberley's point (5) is that a university should be 
detached from the concerns of the economy and the career preparation of 
students. This is hard to justify. Universities, produce "public goods" as 
well as the benefits to students that we have been talking about. Many in 
the educational debate are demanding a greater contribution from uni-
versities to the capacity of the country to compete in the international 
economic order (Slaugher & Leslie, 1997). Why then could this not be 
legitimately considered? The benefits to industry and national competi-
tiveness are directly connected to the teaching and research mandates of 
the university, so the justification may be instrumental but it is an inter-
nal part of what universities do. The notion of instrumental value sup-
ports inclusion, not exclusion. 
Keeping theory and its application together in the university has 
advantages. As I have argued elsewhere (Carson, 1998), central to the 
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notion of a liberal education from Plato onwards has been a fundamental 
concern with the whole person — emotions, intellect and spirit. It 
involves guiding students toward clarity and truth; developing in them 
an appreciation of the principles that are at the foundation of human 
knowledge; and helping them to acquire the scholarly virtues, such as 
respect for evidence, open-mindedness and tolerance for the views of 
others. There is nothing about the so-called applied subjects that is 
inconsistent with this. Engineering students study fluid mechanics; in 
education there is cognitive psychology and in business, students take 
courses in finance. In all respects that are relevant to liberal education, 
these courses do not differ from those in the arts, humanities, social sci-
ences or natural sciences. Indeed, in most cases, the professional courses 
are applications or derivations of them. Further, professional and applied 
programs would be badly harmed if they were forced out of universities. 
An undergraduate business education, for example, usually requires that 
thirty to fifty percent of the course work be done in arts and sciences. 
Essential to a professional education in any field is exposure to a wide 
variety of disciplines and perspectives. This would be lost if business 
and other applied programs were conducted outside of the university 
environment. 
Objectivity and Civility in the University 
To be sure, there have always been debates within the university 
about the nature of objectivity and truth (6). But the cultural left is 
importing something very different. Searle (1995, p. 28) comments, 
"there has been a sea change in discussions of the aims of education in 
that the ideals which were previously shared by nearly everyone in the 
disputes — ideals of truth, rationality and objectivity, for example — are 
now rejected by many of the challengers even as ideals. This is new." 
For the cultural left, the transformation of society is the ideal. It is main-
tained that all texts, ideas, opinions and statements are cultural. They are 
expressions of power by dominant groups, i.e., white males of European 
decent. This viewpoint rests on the notion that we cannot know anything 
absolutely. All knowledge is relative. A perspective can only be judged 
within the context of an interpretive framework, for example, by the 
norms of a particular group or culture (Martin, 1993, pp. 207-211). 
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The main problem with this transformational thesis, and Emberley 
recognizes it (p. 107), is that these epistemological underpinnings are 
highly dubious (Martin, 1993; Searle, 1995). Unfortunately for the theory 
of relativism, the relativists themselves are its biggest liability. They claim 
we are trapped within our cultural belief-system. We are in a conceptual 
box and are unable to see outside or grasp higher order principles that 
would allow us to evaluate the validity of norms, beliefs and judgments 
within our own box or those of another belief-system. But, the relativists, 
themselves, seem to have managed to escape. If they were trapped like 
everyone else they would see only the confines of their own box. Indeed, 
they would not be able to grasp the notion that they were confined or that 
there would be something beyond confinement. The relativists invariably 
seem to be able to draw on principles and understandings that go beyond 
the interior of their own boxes which they then use to evaluate themselves 
and others. The cultural left, for example, appears to know that political 
principles like equality and liberty for women and minorities ought to 
have a higher priority than other principles, such as research or preparation 
for employment, in establishing what universities should do. So they have 
been able to discover knowledge and truth beyond their own box. And 
they have been able to judge their own principles to be superior to the 
principles of the box in which their political opponents conceptually 
reside. Relativism it seems does not even appear to have the support of its 
own proponents. Now, the fact that relativists do not act in accordance 
with their own theoretical commitments does not mean that relativism as a 
theory is wrong. But it does mean that the political actions of the cultural 
left do not have a grounding in a theory that they actually believe. 
Very few philosophers or social scientists would deny that subjectiv-
ity plays a considerable role in the way that we perceive situations, 
approach problems and evaluate evidence. We all make judgments based 
on personal values and perspectives — everyone is subjective to some 
extent. But, the cultural left seems to leverage the admission of some sub-
jectivity all the way to cultural revolution. That is far too extreme. 
Characteristic of actual scholarly research is an ongoing attempt to make 
adjustments and corrections which are necessary to manage the results of 
importing one's own point of view into the investigation (Passmore, 
1984, p. 158). All that is being claimed is that there is an objective reality 
that is external to the investigator and that it has at least some important 
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function in determining what is true and how adequate a theory is in 
explaining the world (Martin, 1993, p. 213). 
Emberley knows that the attack on objectivity by the cultural left, 
mainly through postmodernist theory, will not bring an end to the univer-
sity (p. 113). But I am less worried about its pervasiveness or harmful 
effects than he is. The postmodernists put their politics forward in a way 
that closes off the possibility of any reasoned debate just as does Marxist 
dogma or even existentialist ideology, both of which were prevalent in 
the 1960s. Despite the fact that Marxists and existentialists would at 
least admit the possibility of objective truth, neither would accept as 
legitimate any evidence that could be used to refute their theories. 
Critiques of Marxism were dismissed as nothing more than the political 
moves of the dominant social classes against the oppressed. And existen-
tialists deflected challenges with the claim that they were inauthentic. 
We hear much less from them today. Postmodernism will, similarly, find 
its place in our intellectual history as new academic paradigms take over. 
Moving, finally, to Emberley's condition of civility (7), there are two 
issues to examine: the relationship between university and civility, and 
the extent of the damage being done by the uncivilized behavior of the 
cultural left. On the first matter, we need to establish whether the con-
cept of a university is really inextricably wound up with the notion of 
civility. Consider three possibilities. First, civility is a central part of the 
concept of university — i.e., the relationship between them is one of 
logical necessity. Since Emberley defines a university in terms of civitas 
and conversation (an inherently civilized form of discourse) he is com-
mitted to this strong form of link between civility and the university. 
Accordingly, an institution which does not embody the characteristic of 
civility as Emberley describes it could not be called a university. Second, 
the concept of a university logically implies a weaker version of civility 
— the minimum enabling conditions of discourse. Individuals must at 
least allow others to speak and be heard. Third, we could say that civility 
is a quality indicator of a university. Institutions in which courtesy, 
decorum, graciousness, politeness, etc. are typical characteristics are 
qualitatively superior to those in which we find only the minimal condi-
tions of discourse enablement. 
Emberley is committed to the first interpretation. He gets the second 
interpretation for free since his richer notion of civility implies minimum 
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enabling conditions. And, he subscribes to the third, not only because it 
is his preference, but because the evaluative approval of civility is 
packed into his conceptual analysis of academe in the first interpretation. 
If Emberley had argued from the standpoint of the third interpreta-
tion, i.e., that civility is merely a quality indicator, he would have found 
this difficult to sustain. He could claim that universities are better places 
if they are civilized; the cultural left could counter that civility may be 
desirable, but it is not as important as raising the awareness of members 
of the academic community to issues of justice and equality in relation to 
race and gender. The issue of which position should take priority would 
doubtless end in a standoff. It is unlikely that the parties would be able to 
agree on a higher order principle on the basis of which the dispute could 
be resolved. This is mainly because the cultural left would not admit to 
any universal principles beyond politics. The second interpretation, (i.e., 
minimum enabling conditions) would probably have been acceptable to 
the combatants. Even the cultural left would concede that everyone has a 
right to be heard, notwithstanding that their ultimate objectives are more 
political than epistemological. Their theoretical position does not compel 
them to be completely belligerent. 
This would not have been enough for Emberley, though. It is unfor-
tunate because in terms of logical necessity, this is all that is implied by 
the concept of a university. Even if we accept Emberley's description of 
the hostile environment that exists within Canadian universities and the 
civility which has been its casualty, we still call these institutions univer-
sities, and their graduates continue to be regarded as being educated. 
Whatever conclusions we might draw about quality, the concept of uni-
versity is still intact despite the lack of civility. And, as for the essential 
link between universities and conversation, suppose a university oper-
ated entirely by a non-interactive distance technology or by correspon-
dence. Students and faculty would certainly communicate with one 
another, and learning would take place. Some academics might argue 
that this is a very poor substitute for face-to-face interchanges, but the 
institution could still be said to be a university and the students educated 
by it. The same point could be made in the case of students sitting in 
large classes where lectures are given and questions asked and answered, 
but with little Emberley-style conversation taking place. In these situa-
tions the issue of civility does not really come to the forefront. In sum, it 
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is hard to escape the conclusion that Professor Emberley has drawn us a 
picture of one type of a university — not the full spectrum of qualifiers. 
The second issue to be considered is the extent of damage being 
done by the cultural left. This is hard to assess. But, I think there is much 
less of it than Emberley does. Not all members of the cultural left are 
militant; or if so, not as boorish as he describes. Further, some institu-
tions across Canada are more socially conservative than others. In them, 
the enmity and rancor is considerably less. Finally, the postmodernist 
debate is more localized within universities than Emberley represents. 
The hard sciences and professional schools hear much less about it. 
Academe may suffer, but will survive. 
CONCLUSION 
It is easy to see great value in Professor Emberley's conception of a 
student-centered institution which connects the scholarly culture with the 
ontological yearnings of students and seeks to meet their needs through 
reading and leisurely conversation in subject areas which are of inherent 
value. But this would not necessarily meet everyone's needs. University 
subjects can have instrumental as well as inherent value, and many stu-
dents are attracted to the former as well as the latter. That is why applied 
degree programs such as engineering and business are so popular with 
undergraduate students. And, it is at least part of the reason why parents, 
business, government and the public are willing to support universities. I 
doubt that anyone would oppose the humanistic model; they would not, 
however, want to be constrained to support it alone. 
The weakness in Zero Tolerance: Hot Button Politics in Canada s 
Universities is that it does not provide a very good answer to someone 
who wants to know why only a s ingle a l ternat ive is legi t imate . 
Cambridge, Oxford, Edinburgh, London, Paris and Harvard do not fit the 
model put forward by Emberley, but they are clearly among the greatest 
universities in the world. Surely there are arguments to support them. 
What I think contributes to their enduring status is the very fact that they 
are engaged so broadly across the forms of human knowledge and activ-
ity. They combine the theoretical and the applied; and they are capable 
of fulfilling the needs of their highly diverse educational constituencies. 
The vast majori ty of Canadian universities do this well, and it is a 
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tremendous strength, in my judgement. Whereas Emberley fears that the 
stress of dealing with multiple demands is crippling universities, I think 
that developing a capacity to respond to these many-sided pressures is 
what generates their ability to deal with a complex fu ture .^ 
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Notes 
1 Since ci t izenship and publ ic service are tied to the way government and 
the e c o n o m y actually funct ion, it is hard to imagine h o w this object ive could be 
achieved if the universi ty considered only theory not application. Also, the " the-
o ry" and "app l i ed" dist inction is very artificial. For example , the discipline of 
f i nance is a central to all bus iness school p rograms , but its theory is h ighly 
mathemat ica l and based on proofs . It can be applied of course. But so can most 
scientif ic and social scientif ic theory. Organizat ional behaviour , to take another 
example , is appl ied psychology. 
2 I m a k e a similar point in Carson (1998). 
3 This f a m o u s term was coined by Clarke Kerr (1963). 
^ Perhaps one migh t argue that we should be looking at the far distant past 
— the Midd le Ages . But if so, it makes that historical or ' t radi t ionalis t ' argu-
men t look t rumped up: tradition is def ined as whatever t ime line supports the 
prefer red posi t ion. 
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